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This paper addresses the implications of open–ended instances of use and 
non–instrumental person–thing interactions. Central to the argument is an 
analysis of Heideggerian work on technology and particularly of the notions 
of Gestell [enframing] and Gelassenheit [releasement]. These name 
respectively modern technology’s inherent danger – a totalising 
‘unconcealment’ of the world as mere resources to be exploited – and a 
possible gateway from it – in the form of an open mode of thinking, void of 
calculative demands towards what is encountered. Suggesting that a possible 
transition from Gestell to Gelassenheit needs not be intended as an 
exclusively metaphysical shift, as some have argued, it will then be 
considered how a different way of thinking could be prepared and assisted by 
a different way of acting, of doing. Such radical modification would crucially 
require questioning the very notion of use and its hazy relation to 
functionality. The paper ultimately makes a case for modes of interacting 
with artefacts through acts of use as ends in themselves, transcending 
teleological explanations and not exhausted in utilitarian functionalism. It is 
proposed that a possible prototype for this type of inherently ludic 
exploratory doing might be found in the activities of French revolutionary 
group Situationist International.  
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Agency: masters and slaves 
Understanding artefacts as performative, as theorised by design 
historian and critic Damon Taylor (Taylor, 2011, p. i), as a much more 
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complex reality than a mere stream of inert, ever–compliant utility tools, 
consequently puts into question the alleged agency of human actants within 
the mechanics of everyday life. The intention to move beyond the 
problematic humanist rhetoric of the intentional, self–constituting human 
subject has been central to the study of person–thing interactions within the 
fields of material culture studies and philosophy of technology as well as, of 
course, STS. Bruno Latour’s Actor–Network–Theory (ANT) has been a prime 
example of such theoretical effort. Artefacts, Latour rightly notes, ‘might 
authorise, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render 
possible, forbid and so on’ (Latour, 2005, p. 72). This way, the very concept 
of agency can be said to be somewhat shattered and made social – ‘an 
association between entities’ (ibidem, p. 65), some human some non–
human – thus ceasing to be conceived as a property of a subject. Building on 
these theories, what follows will firstly make a case for rejecting an 
understanding of agency, in relation to objects, as positioned on a linear 
spectrum, oscillating between two polarities: on one hand, the absolute 
mastery of humans over instruments at their utter disposal; on the other, a 
gloomy dictatorship of things over supposedly passive users, slaves at the 
mercy of their own tools. It is instead claimed that these two allegedly 
opposite perspectives are far more entangled than one might assume and 
by no means mutually exclusive. Therefore, simply framing the issue as a 
matter of degrees of agency, on a hypothetical continuum ranging from 
‘complete control’ to ‘complete subjugation’ is perhaps inadequate. It is 
instead proposed, as counterintuitive as it might sound, that dichotomising 
these two aspects is deceptive because, more often than not, we might well 
be both masters and slaves simultaneously. The construction of this 
argument will mostly hinge upon a reading of Heidegger’s work on 
technology and will pave the way for a discussion on thinking and acting in 
relation to technology and artefacts. This will then lead to a consideration of 
how we might imagine, and indeed devise, alternative ways of encountering 
and, more generally, being with things when constructing acts of use as a 
form of exploratory playful behaviour. The paper will conclude by looking at 
the activity of French revolutionary group Situationist International, in order 
to discuss the potential implications and political relevance of everyday ludic 
experience. 
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Revealing: Gestell 
In 1954 German philosopher Martin Heidegger first published the 
seminal essay The Question Concerning Technology, which had the intent of 
uncovering no less than the essence of technology. The first thing that must 
be noted is that Heidegger’s analysis is not primarily concerned with 
technological things in and of themselves. Indeed, he claims: 
‘Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology […] the 
essence of technology is by no means anything technological.’ 
(Heidegger, 1977 [1954], p. 4) 
Secondly, the essence of technology cannot be fully exhausted in its 
instrumentality, in it being an instrumentum (ibidem, p. 5) – i.e. a means to 
an end. Again, while this is indeed true for how technological things are 
encountered, it still does not identify the essence that permeates them. If 
this were the case, the will to assert our agency, taming technology through 
enhanced mastery, would be all that is required to us. Rather, such essence 
– that does imply instrumentality – has to be grasped as a particular ‘way of 
revealing’ [Das Entbergen] (ibidem, pp. 11–12). Understood in this way, 
technology’s fundamental instrumentality is actually grounded in causality, 
intended as causing the coming to presence of something, as bringing 
something out of concealment. What is at stake, what is being 
‘unconcealed’ through technological mediation, Heidegger argues, is the 
very world of which we are part. Crucially, then, the mode of revealing that 
is characteristic of technology consists in presenting the whole world as a 
mere stockpile of resources that human beings are encouraged to summon 
and exploit. This way, everything everywhere is reduced to ‘standing–
reserve’ [Bestand] (ibidem, p. 17) through a process that Heidegger calls 
Gestell: ‘enframing’. Technology’s essence can thus be understood as the 
setting in motion of a constant instrumental demand that extends to the 
totality of the existent. An ever–quantifying way of thinking about the world 
as nothing but an endless series of in–order–to utility tools. Not exclusively 
technological things then, but the entire world – ourselves included, if we 
think about the concept of ‘human resources’, for instance – thus becomes 
revealed as a means to an end. Everything is enframed, everything is in 
question. 
This seemingly inescapable, pure utilitarianism lays bare the paradox 
mentioned earlier in regards to the master–slave dichotomy. According to 
Heidegger, we are enslaved precisely through an insatiable will to absolute 
mastery of the world, through a ‘single way of revealing’ (Heidegger, 1977 
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[1954], p. 32). That is, our very obsession with mastery is itself a form of 
somewhat covert slavery to technological things. As Heidegger himself 
explicitly notes elsewhere, ‘man's unconditional mastery over the earth, and 
the execution of this will, harbor within themselves that subjugation to 
technology’ (Heidegger, 1993 [1981], p. 14). 
Thinking: Gelassenheit 
What we begin to see is that the chief concern in Heidegger’s critique of 
technology is the emergence of an alienating and profoundly impoverishing 
mode of thinking – and therefore being in – the world we inhabit. Which of 
course begs the question: can an alternative to such thinking be developed 
and, if so, what would that be? Heidegger directly addressed these 
questions a few years later, in 1959, by formulating the concept of 
Gelassenheit (Heidegger, 1969 [1959]). The argument here primarily hinges 
upon the opposition between ‘calculative thinking’ – i.e. what we have seen 
to emerge through Gestell – and what Heidegger calls ‘meditative thinking’ 
(ibidem). Thinking that is ‘meditative’, Heidegger claims, is precisely what 
could enable us to overcome the reifying disclosure of the world that is 
proper of enframing. This is because such thinking, being radically stripped 
of instrumental demands towards the world that is encountered, instead 
remains meditatively ‘open to its content, open to what is given’ (ibidem, 
pp. 24–25). Before we proceed any further, it should be noted that the 
frequent and potentially equivocal use throughout this paper of the term 
‘meditative’ [besinnliche – which might alternatively be rendered as 
‘contemplative’] shall not be mistakenly linked to popular meditation 
practices such as that of ‘mindfulness’. That being said, engaging in the 
openness of this mode of thinking entails an attitude of Gelassenheit, often 
rendered in English as releasement. What is, then, that thinking must be 
released from, so to speak, for it to be open to its content and therefore 
meditative? Heidegger’s rather cryptic response is that thinking must be rid 
of and disentangled from willing. One could perhaps say that what he has in 
mind here is a thinking that would be primarily concerned with itself as an 
undirected exploratory process, rather than with the result of such process. 
Metaphorically speaking, a similar difference might be said to exist between 
walking in order to reach a destination and walking as strolling, as 
intentionally purpose–free wandering. Still, what makes the above assertion 
profoundly counterintuitive is that, of course, to relinquish willful thinking – 
giving way to what Heidegger calls ‘non–willing’, or sometimes ‘letting–be’ – 
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surely requires an effort in itself: that is, to willingly renounce willing 
(ibidem, p.59). This admittedly abstruse argument has inevitably resulted in 
diverging interpretations. 
Firstly, the notions of non–willing and releasement must not lead to the 
hasty conclusion that what Heidegger urges is a delusional form of 
reactionary pseudo–primitivism and unlikely return to a pre–technological 
age (cf. Agamben, 2009; Dreyfus and Spinosa, 2003). Indeed, Heidegger 
explicitly concedes that ‘[i]t would be foolish to attack technology blindly’ 
(ibidem, p. 53). On the contrary, he proposes, 
‘[w]e can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also 
deny them the right to dominate us’ (ibidem, p. 54). 
We can see, then, that the alternative relation to technology that 
Heidegger is describing is not the form of total rejection that philosopher 
Peter–Paul Verbeek, for instance, seems to find in the concept of 
Gelassenheit (Verbeek, 2011, p. 71). Rather, the term names a way of being 
at once immersed in yet unshackled by technology and technological things, 
a comportment of releasement toward, not from things (Heidegger, 1969 
[1959], p. 54) [Gelassenheit zu den Dingen]. That is, Heidegger’s releasement 
is a relationship with technology, albeit a different and freed one. 
A second matter of controversy is that, again contrarily to what Verbeek 
appears to infer, Heidegger’s proposition is not meant to encourage a form 
of mindless quietism or abstracted passivity. Not only must one will non–
willing, as mentioned above. Also, one must not intend the process of 
releasement, as Verbeek does, as a purely metaphysical undertaking 
whereby thinking differently alone would suffice (Verbeek, 2011, p. 72). 
Granted, Heidegger’s ultimate focus is indeed on the mode of thinking that 
could allow a richer dimension of revealing. Nevertheless, we shall see that 
this does not undermine the importance that acting, and therefore potential 
bodily person–thing engagements, has in Heidegger’s Gelassenheit. 
Acting: practical a priori 
In order to understand the sometime downplayed role that acting can 
hold within Heidegger’s framework, we should now turn to Reiner 
Schürmann’s book Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to 
Anarchy (1987 [1982]). Particularly throughout a chapter eloquently titled 
Acting, the Condition for Thinking, Schürmann discusses something that will 
be extremely useful to the present discussion: namely, what he calls a 
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‘practical a priori’ (Schürmann, 1987 [1982], p. 236). He notes that, in 
Heidegger, thinking is ‘made dependent upon a practical condition’ and 
‘does not arise without preparation’ (ibidem, p. 235). When looking at the 
opening of Being and Time, for instance, one finds the two following 
questions and answers: 
‘Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really 
mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. […] But are we nowadays even 
perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not 
at all.’ (Heidegger, 2015 [1927], p. 19). 
What Schürmann argues is that, while the first query concerns a purely 
philosophical issue, the second one ‘is no longer cognitive […]. It is not even 
philosophical anymore’ (Schürmann, 1987 [1982], p. 237). Rather, he 
continues, this second question points to a type of comportment. That is, a 
‘practical modification of existence’ (ibidem, p. 238 [my italic]) through a 
pre–philosophical perplexity that must be awoken as necessary condition of 
possibility in order to then confront the first, essentially philosophical 
question. This holds true for releasement as well: ‘[t]o understand 
releasement, one must be released’ (ibidem, p. 236). 
A transformed practical a priori, intended as a preparatory exercise, 
would arguably need to retain the traits proper of the transformed mode of 
thinking it aims to lead to, and indeed mirror it. Such practice would then 
be, as it were, a form of ‘meditative practice’, of contemplative doing not 
underpinned by instrumental demands. A ‘non–willing practice’ concerned 
with itself as an open process. If such a ‘released practice’ – a released 
practical a priori – is to be conceptualised, we shall begin to consider what 
this would mean in terms of the actual ‘unavoidable use of technical 
devices’ (Heidegger, 1969 [1959], p. 54). Indeed, the practice discussed here 
is one revolving around encounters with artefacts, around those ‘acts of use’ 
that Heidegger acknowledges to be inevitable and through which a freed 
relationship between persons and things might be established. How are we, 
then, to understand and reimagine these acts of use according to a posture 
of Gelassenheit? 
Using: play 
It would now seem appropriate to focus our attention onto the very 
notion of use as such, and to do so through a critical lens, in order to first 
disentangle it from dogmatic rhetoric. ‘Use’ colloquially names an action of a 
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subject onto an ‘object’, in a way that is functional to the achievement of an 
end goal. This way, the use of some–thing, presented as an act that is 
operated in order to arrive at a result, essentially identifies an act that is 
given legitimacy through something external to it: its purpose, its telos, its 
function. Thus understood, the artefact encountered inevitably remains 
confined to the status of ‘tool’, of in–order–to device. Consequently, its 
most important in–use feature would appear to be its efficient function–ing, 
its usefulness, in a pragmatic sense, in enabling the fulfilment of a plan. The 
apprehension of use described here seems to confirm the reach of the 
calculative thinking that Heidegger takes issue with and, conversely, how 
glaringly at odds it is with the non–willing and radically open–ended 
relationship with technology that he advocates. 
Narrow, efficiency–obsessed understandings of functionality have been 
largely disputed (see, amongst many others: Adorno, 1979; Dunne and Raby, 
2001; Taylor, 2011). A first liberating step, for both practitioners and design 
scholars, has been that of challenging the allegedly inescapable coupling of 
functionality with practical utility that had dominated mainstream design 
discourses. However, a second and even more resilient binary can perhaps 
be put into question now: namely, the coupling of functionality with use. 
Indeed, function intended as an inferred plan of action, or a ‘script’ (Akrich, 
1992), regardless of what that plan would entail, clearly still betrays a 
willing, a calculative demand towards the artefact encountered. As 
Theodora Vardouli notes, however, ‘there is little consensus about how the 
concepts of function and use relate to each other’ (Vardouli, 2015, p. 1), 
hence the frequent assumption that the two are in fact inextricably co–
dependent. Such assumption appears to be very much present in most of 
the practical work at which I was hinting above too, as a critique of 
utilitarian functionalism and rejection of efficiency has often resulted in the 
unfortunate removal of these projects from the sphere of everyday use and 
bodily action, favouring instead the highly curated settings of galleries or 
museums. 
It is through the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben that we 
can instead begin to entertain a more radical understanding of use, as he 
confronts the difficulty of decoupling use and function in his book The Use of 
Bodies (2015). When discussing the Aristotelian distinction between 
‘productive instruments and instruments of use (which produce nothing 
except their use)’ (Agamben, 2015, p. 12), Agamben acknowledges that 
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‘[w]e are so accustomed to thinking of use and instrumentality as a 
function of an external goal that it is not easy for us to understand a 
dimension of use entirely independent of an end’ (ibidem, p. 12). 
Agamben’s recourse to Aristotle provides yet another interesting insight 
only a few pages later, when he presents a similar distinction between 
poiesis and praxis: while the former is defined by the presence of an 
external end (a telos), the latter is a mode of acting that ‘is in itself the end’ 
(ibidem, p. 21). Further, Agamben finds in Lucretius an analogous 
theorisation of use as ‘completely emancipated from every relation to a 
predetermined end […] beyond every teleology’ (ibidem, p. 51). Here, 
through a fascinating reflection on the use that living beings make of their 
own body parts, it is suggested that the function of some–thing (a limb, in 
this case) is created through use, rather than being what guides it. This way, 
function can be understood as an elusive yet distinct stage within a process 
of use. 
What Agamben offers through his analysis is the invaluable possibility to 
isolate a form of self–sufficient, radically autonomous use from the function 
that would otherwise eventually emerge through it (cf. Agamben, 2005, p. 
64 for a similar argument). Appropriating a recurrent phrasing in Agamben’s 
work, it could be said that, this way, function would be ‘rendered 
inoperative’ (e.g. see Agamben, 2015, p. 30). We can see how this operation 
points precisely to the type of ‘willing non–willing’ that we have sought to 
identify throughout. That is, the tainting emergence of function could be 
resolutely neutralised, or perhaps indefinitely postponed, through a form of 
critical use that is ceaselessly and creatively reinvented: a use that, as 
Vardouli notes, is ever–unfolding and spontaneously improvisational 
(Vardouli, 2015, p. 14). The seemingly daunting task of conceiving a form of 
use that is disinterested, open–ended, creative, spontaneous, actually 
names something as mundane as our ubiquitous interaction with 
technology: that is, play. 
This assertion, however, should be treated with caution, for it could 
easily lead to deceiving conclusions, as the enframing of calculative thinking 
is always potentially at work. Firstly, the ludic engagement with artefacts 
that is proposed here shall not be understood as a game. This delicate 
distinction has been accurately described by Taylor. Games, he observes, 
‘contain a (usually explicit) script […] whereas play can be said to be much 
broader and open’ (Taylor, 2011, p. 151). Further, play ‘can be the 
suspension of goal–directed activity […]. Play can be for play’s sake’ 
(Matthews, Stienstra and Djajadiningrat, cited in Taylor, 2011, p. 151). The 
Acts of Use from Gestell to Gelassenheit: Calculative Thinking and Exploratory Doing 
751 
practice of play – or a playful practical a priori – can therefore be intended 
as an undirected process whereby one gets willingly lost in a ‘delight 
internal to the act’ (Agamben, 2015, p. 51). 
Drifting: things 
A possible prototype for such fundamentally unplanned and exploratory 
activity could perhaps be identified in the work of French revolutionary 
group Situationist International (SI hereafter). Although the SI was officially 
active only between 1957 and 1972, their rich legacy remains highly 
influential across several fields, from art and architecture to cultural and 
political theory. The SI devised a unitary programme intended to counter 
the dramatically alienated practice of everyday life in modern society, 
advocating its radical alteration through the deliberate ‘construction of 
situations’ (cf. Knabb, 2006). Such situations essentially involved tactics for 
experimental comportment, often enacted by members of the group. 
Interestingly, as Tom Bunyard notes, ‘[c]onstructed situations […] were 
deliberately designed so as to include chance elements’, which ‘were held to 
render lived experience potentially ludic’ (Bunyard, Forthcoming). This way, 
he continues, ‘[l]ife, as realised art, would become akin to play’ (ibidem). 
Central to this work was, on one hand, a fierce criticism of modernist 
functionalism and ‘urbanistic hyper–planning’ (McDonough, 2009, p. 20) as 
well as, on the other hand, an attempt to reignite an element of 
spontaneous creativity and adventurousness within daily existence. One 
notable situationist technique is that of the dérive, French for ‘drift’. Dérives 
‘entailed ‘drifting’ through the city, […] following no prior plan other than 
the whims and desires provoked by the local ambiences’ (Bunyard, 
Forthcoming). 
This technique, ultimately intended to afford a condition permanent play 
[jeu permanent] through an incessant ‘succession of new fields of chance’ 
(Bunyard, 2011, p.74), retains a number of obvious similarities to the form 
of critical use that was described earlier on. Firstly, it might not be much of a 
stretch to understand the strategic and therefore agenda–driven nature of 
dérives as somewhat akin to Heidegger’s resolve for ‘non–willing’. Secondly, 
we can certainly see a clear parallel with the ‘openness’ of Gelassenheit, as 
those who engage in dérives ‘drop […] their other usual motives for 
movement and action, and let themselves be drawn by the attraction of the 
terrain and the encounters they find there’ (Knabb, 2006, p. 62). 
Importantly, this points to a shift in the relation to what is encountered: that 
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is, it could be argued that the SI played with – more so than through – the 
city. 
Despite their interest in artworks and architecture, the SI strangely 
neglected the realm of everyday use–objects. However, if we were to 
conceptualise a released practice in relation to technology as a form of 
dérive, the artefacts encountered through such practice would best be 
regarded as ‘drifting companions’ or ‘comrades’, rather than toys as 
‘instruments of play’. This would suggest an understanding of use as an 
experience grounded in a form of deep mutuality between user and ‘used’, 
the implications of which I have in part addressed elsewhere (Chapman and 
Marmont, Forthcoming). Although leading to very different conclusions, this 
form of mutuality is also remarkably reminiscent of Russian constructivist 
Alexander Rodchenko’s appeal for artefacts to cease being ‘mournful slaves’ 
and being instead intended as ‘comrades’ (Kiaer, 1996, p.3) 
This being said, what can be understood through Situationist work much 
more explicitly than through Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, is the overt political 
relevance inherent in this ‘playful–constructive behaviour’ (Knabb, 2006, p. 
62), as well as in the artefacts involved in it. The performativity of such 
artefacts would ultimately consist in the recruitment – the ‘interpellation’, in 
Althusserian terms (cf. Taylor, 2011, p. 54) – of a particular breed of user: a 
‘dissident user’ that embraces the subversive power of play while refusing 
to relegate it to leisure time. This militantly playful practice could be instead 
interwoven with the very fabric of mundane activity and everyday 
encounters with artefacts, rather than separated from it as an ‘exceptional 
intermezzo’ (Huizinga, 1949, p. 9). The hope, then, is that an increasing 
portion of our relationship with things, with technology, could thus be 
deliberately transformed into a contemplative exercise, an exploratory 
doing that does not need to arrive anywhere specific. Turned, as beautifully 
put by Schürmann, ‘into a groundless play without why’ (Schürmann, 1987 
[1982], p. 243). 
Ultimately, what has been presented in this paper is an effort to 
introduce additional operational coordinates to already rich debates around 
the ‘thick imbroglio’ (Latour, 2005, p. 46) that is the realm of human acting. 
In particular, this study has intended to restate, more or less explicitly, the 
profoundly political and tactical implications that a certain approach to the 
issue begets. 
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